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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
New Sweden Irrigation District ("New Sweden") is an irrigation district organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Idaho, with its operations located within Bonneville 
County. New Sweden owns approximately 125 miles of canals. (R., p. 30B: Affidavit of Kail 
Sheppard ("Sheppard Aff."), ~ 7). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 42-1102 and 42-1209, New Sweden owns an easement 
and/or right-of-way on each side of the canals for the purpose of cleaning, maintenance, and 
repair. The same statutes do not allow any structures to encroach onto the easement without 
permission from New Sweden. There is no requirement for New Sweden to notify a landowner 
prior to entering the easement to conduct maintenance, cleaning, or repair work. (R., p. 30B: 
Sheppard Aff., ~ 5). 
In addition to the canals and buildings, New Sweden owns two mowers, each having a 
side-mower on the right side of the tractor that can be raised and lowered hydraulically. (R., p. 
30B-30C: Sheppard Aff., ~ 9). There is also a mower that trails the tractor. (R., p. 30B-30C: 
Sheppard Aff., ~ 9). These types of mowers have been used by New Sweden since 
approximately 1995 to cut weeds and small tree saplings along the canal banks. (R., p. 30B-
30C: Sheppard Aff., ~ 8). Other irrigation companies use the same type of mowers in their 
operations. (R., p. 30C: Sheppard Aff., ~ 9). As is necessary for the maintenance of the canals, 
New Sweden also uses a large excavator for canal cleaning and debris removal. (R., p. 30C: 
Sheppard Aff., ~9). Due to the arm swing over the excavator's track, a minimum of 16 feet is 
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required for the excavator's safe operation. (R., p. 30C: Sheppard Aff., ~ 10). Given the size of 
the equipment required to clean, maintain, and repair the canals, a minimum of a sixteen (16) 
foot easement is required. (R., p. 30C: Sheppard Aff., ~ 10). 
New Sweden trains its employees on the proper mowing procedure within the easement, 
as well as procedures required when temporarily leaving an easement due to an unmovable 
obstruction. (R., p. 30B: Sheppard Aff., ~ 6). When a mower must temporarily leave the 
easement, the mower blades are turned off and are not restarted until the mower has returned to 
the easement. (Id.). 
On or about June 25, 2009, Kent Ockerman was mowing the canal banks that run along 
the Morgan property. (R., p. 301: Affidavit of Kent Ockerman ("Ockerman Aff."), ~ 7). Mr. 
Ockerman has been an employee of New Sweden since approximately 1997. (R., p. 30G-30H: 
Ockerman Aff., ~ 2). He is very familiar with proper mower operation. (Id.). Mr. Ockerman 
has been operating the mowers for approximately 10 years. (R., p. 30G-30H: Ockerman Aff., ~~ 
2-4). Mr. Ockerman is familiar with the Morgan property and has mowed along the canal on 
multiple occasions, including the date that gave rise to this litigation. (R., p. 30H: Ockerman, ~ 
5). Due to various structures being placed within the easement, Mr. Ockerman was required to 
temporarily leave the easement. (R., p. 30H-301: Ockerman Aff., ~ 6). Mr. Ockerman has 
followed New Sweden procedures when mowing the canal along the Morgan property, including 
on June 25, 2009. (Jd.). 
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On June 25, 2009, Mr. Ockerman was confronted by Mr. Bradley Morgan. (R., p. 301: 
Ockerman AfL -J 7). Mr. Morgan was angry that Mr. Ockerman had entered the property to 
mow the canal without advance notice. (Id). He was also angry that plants that border the 
canal, located inside the easement, were cut. (Id). Because the disagreement was escalating, 
Mr. Ockerman contacted his supervisor, Kail Sheppard, to discuss the issue with Mr. Morgan. 
(R., p. 301: Ockerman Aff., ,; 7; R., p. 30D: Sheppard Aff., ~ 12). Mr. Sheppard arrived to 
address Mr. Morgan's concerns. The confrontation continued to escalate and Mr. Sheppard 
requested assistance from the Bonneville County Sheriffs Office to help keep the peace. (R., p. 
30D: Sheppard Aff., ,-r,-r 15-16). Law enforcement came but did not opine as to whether New 
Sweden held a valid easement or had engaged in any wrongdoing. No citations were issued. 
(R., p. 301: Ockerman Aff., ~ 8; R., p. 30D: Sheppard Aff., ,-r 16). 
There are several structures that currently encroach on the New Sweden easement, 
including, but not limited to, sprinklers, a garden plot (that existed at the time of the incident 
giving rise to this litigation), and multiple sheds and/or outbuildings, none of which were built 
on permanent foundations and are movable. (R., p. 30D: Sheppard Aff., ,; 17; Tr., p. 389:2-24). 
New Sweden has never given permission for any of the mentioned structures to be placed on the 
easement. (Jd). No structures outside of the easement were backed into or hit by any New 
Sweden employee while mowing the canal on the Morgan property. (R., p. 301: Ockerman Aff., 
~~ 9-12; R., p. 30D: Sheppard Aff.,,-r~ 20-21). It would have been readily apparent to a driver 
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had a structure been inadvertently hit while driving the mower. (R., p. 30I: Ockerman Aff., ~12; 
R., p. 30D: Sheppard Aff., ~ 21). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
In an effort to maintain clarity and orderly address the issues raised on appeal, there are 
two primary disputes addressed in this appeal, (1) the size and scope of the easement adjudicated 
via the summary judgment motion filed by New Sweden and the ability of New Sweden to 
exercise its statutorily mandated duties of cleaning, maintenance, and repair; and (2) whether 
New Sweden proximately caused any damage on Morgan's property outside the easement. Each 
respective dispute will be addressed separately below: 
A. Whether Other Property Owners Were Named Is a New Issue Raised on Appeal 
and Cannot Be Considered for the First Time on Appeal. 
Mr. Morgan raises, for the first time on appeal that other property owners should have 
been included by New Sweden in its declaratory judgment action. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 15, 16 
(see, e.g., "The declaratory judgment action sought to establish the scope and extent of that 
easement along both sides of the canal, but did not name any other property owner. .. "). 
Consistent with long held Idaho legal precedent, an issue raised for the first time on appeal will 
not be considered by the Court. "The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider 
issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 
P.3d 303, 306 (2008). Whether other property owners could or should have been identified in 
the declaratory judgment action is a new issue that was never raised at the lower court. The sole 
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focus of the instant litigation was centered on the easement rights of New Sweden on the Morgan 
property. The filing of the suit against New Sweden for its legal use of its easement rights 
necessitated the counterclaim for declaratory judgment on the Morgan property only. Where 
there is no attempt to prevent New Sweden from cleaning, maintaining, and repairing other areas 
of the New Sweden canals, there is no need to file a declaratory judgment action to declare the 
size and scope of an easement. Thus, the size and scope of an easement on other property 
located adjacent to the New Sweden canals is irrelevant to the instant matter and should not be 
considered by the Court. 
B. The Court Properly Determined the Size and Scope of New Sweden Irrigation 
District's Easement via Summary Judgment. 
On September 6,2011, New Sweden filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a 
declaration ofthe size and scope of the right-of-way along the Morgan property. CR., p. 31). 
Because of the instant dispute and Morgan's claim that New Sweden had no easement rights, 
New Sweden was compelled to seek a declaration of the size and scope of the easement to avoid 
any future disputes as New Sweden attempted to clean, maintain, and repair its canal bordering 
the Morgan property. CR., p. 21). Of primary importance is whether the Court appropriately 
interpreted Idaho Code §§ 42-1102 and 42-1209 in determining the size and scope of the right-
of-way. Pursuant to the unambiguous language of Section 42-1102 and 42-1209, the district 
court correctly held that the size of the right-of-way is determined by the amount ofland that is 
"necessary to properly do the work of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or 
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conduit with personnel and with such equipment as is commonly used, or is reasonably 
adapted, to that work. I.C. § 42-1102. The district court further correctly held that the scope of 
the easement allowed for the removal of bushes, plants, and trees as part of the normal cleaning 
and maintenance obligations. (R., p. 51-53). The district court's interpretation of Sections 42-
1102 and 42-1209 are consistent with the clear and unambiguous language of the statue. 
1. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 and 42-1209 Specifically Identify the 
EasementlRight-of-way Rights for a Canal Company. 
Chapters 11 and 12 of Title 42, Idaho Code, provide the statutory basis for the rights-of-
way associated with a canal or irrigation ditch owner. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 was first 
adopted in 1881. The statute was designed to grant an easement or right-of-way to owners of 
canals and ditches in order to preserve their ability to clean, maintain, and repair the canal or 
ditch. Specifically, House Bill No. 634, which added clarifying language regarding unauthorized 
easements, was introduced to the Idaho House of Representatives and Senate during the 2004 
legislative session. During this session, a bill was introduced by Norm Semanko of the Idaho 
Water Users Association. In his opening remarks to the Idaho House of Representatives on 
February 9, 2004, Mr. Semanko stated that the legislation was designed to clarify the rights of 
canal and ditch owners relative to the easement and/or rights-of-way. 
Idaho law clearly states that an owner of a canal has an obligation to clean, repair and 
maintain its canals. See Sellers v. Powers, 120 Idaho 250,815 P.2d 448 (1991); see also I.e. §§ 
42-1102 and 42-1209. A canal owner who ignores the duty to properly clean, repair, and 
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maintain a canal can be held liable for any subsequent damages that result from the failure. I.C. 
§§ 42-1102 and 42-1209. Idaho Code § 42-1102 reveals in relevant part, "[t]he existence ofa 
visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute notice to the owner, or any subsequent purchaser, 
of the underlying servient estate, that the owner of the ditch, canal or conduit has the right-of-
way and incidental rights confirmed or granted by this section." As such, the existence of a 
visible canal is prima facie evidence of a valid right-of-way in favor of the owner of the canal. It 
is undisputed that there is a visible canal on Morgan's property, thus granting a right-of-way to 
New Sweden. Section 42-1102 continues: 
No person or entity shall cause or permit any encroachments 
onto the right-of-wav, including public or private roads, utilities, 
fences, gates, pipelines, structures, or other construction or 
placement of objects, without the written permission of the owner 
of the right-of-way, in order to ensure that any such encroachments 
will not umeasonably or materially interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of the right-of-way. Encroachments of any kind 
placed in such right-of-way without express written permission 
of the owner of the right-of-way shall be removed at the 
expense of the person or entity causing or permitting such 
encroachment, upon the request of the owner of the right-of-
way, in the event that any such encroachments umeasonably or 
materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the right-of-
way. 
(Emphasis added). The owner of the ditch is the dominant estate holder, whereas the landowner 
where the ditch is located is the servient estate holder. See, e.g., Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 
131,119 Idaho 544, 549-50, 808 P.2d 1289,1294-95 (1991). Thus, the owner of the servient 
estate is permitted to make uses of the property to the extent that it does not unreasonably 
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interfere with the dominant estate owner"s enjoyment of the easement. See Carson v. Elliott, 
111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct. App. 1986); Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 
Idaho 370, 377, 723 P.2d 914,921 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Idaho Code Section 42-1208 specifies that easement or right-of-ways are not subject to 
adverse possession: 
Easements or rights-of-way of irrigation districts, Carey act 
operating companies, nonprofit irrigation entities, lateral ditch 
associations, and drainage districts are not subject to adverse 
possession, and no person shall prevent free access of authorized 
personnel on easements or rights-of-way or construct any 
obstruction on easements or rights-of-way in an effort to adversely 
possess said easement or right-of-way. 
Accordingly, whether the rights have been fully exercised in the past is irrelevant to present and 
future maintenance, cleaning, and repair. Rather, the duty to clean, maintain, and repair the 
canal continues despite a failure to conduct maintenance activities in the past. Idaho Code 
Section 42-1209 mirrors Idaho Code Section 42-1102 and reaffirms that encroachments onto an 
easement owned by an irrigation district are prohibited: 
[NJo person or entity shall cause or permit any encroachments 
onto the easements or rights-of-way, including any public or 
private roads, utilities, fences, gates, pipelines, structures or other 
construction or placement of objects, without the written 
permission of the irrigation district, Carey act operating company, 
nonprofit irrigation entity, lateral ditch association, or drainage 
district owning the easement or right-of-way, in order to ensure 
that any such encroachments will not unreasonably or materially 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-of-
way. Encroachments of any kind placed in such easement or 
right-of-way, without such express written permission shall be 
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removed at the expense of the person or entity causing or 
permitting such encroachments, upon the request of the owner 
of the easement or right-of-way, in the event that any such 
encroachments unreasonably or materially interfere with the use 
and enjoyment of the easement or right-of-way. 
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to the above authority, encroachments of any kind are prohibited in 
the easement unless the servient landowner received permission from the irrigation district. That 
the structures pre-dated the codification of Section 42-1102 is irrelevant as the Idaho Legislature 
made the entire section applicable to canals existing on the date of the act [March 12,1996]. 
I.C. § 42-1102. There is no indication that the language of Section 42-1102 prohibits the 
removal of structures pre-dating the revision to the statute. In fact, considering the longstanding 
requirements that the right-of-ways be maintained free of encumbrances, it strongly supports the 
position that any encumbrance can be removed following judicial petition. In this case, the 
removal of the structures is not a significant hardship because they are not on a permanent 
foundation but are on skids that allow them to be moved away from the canal outside the right-
of-way. (Tr., p. 389:2-24). 
2. The District Court Correctly Determined the Size and Scope of the Right-of-
way. 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102 specifically states in relevant part: 
The right-of-way shall include, but is not limited to, the right to 
enter the land across which the right-of-way extends, for the 
purposes of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or 
conduit, and to OCCUPy such width of the land along the banks 
of the ditch, canal or conduit as is necessary to properly do the 
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work of cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or 
conduit with personnel and with such equipment as is 
commonly used, or is reasonablv adapted, to that work. The 
right-of-way also includes the right to deposit on the banks of the 
ditch or canal the debris and other matter necessarily required to be 
taken from the ditch or canal to properly clean and maintain it, but 
no greater width ofland along the banks of the canal or ditch than 
is absolutely necessary for such deposits shall be occupied by the 
removed debris or other matter. 
(Emphasis added). Section 42-1102 specifies that an easement owner is permitted to occupy the 
width of land required to properly clean, maintain and repair a canal with the equipment 
commonly used to do said work. The statute does not impose a requirement that the equipment 
be the least burdensome but rather that it be the type commonly used to perform the work. 
Absent from the statute is a uniform easement width. Rather, the size of the easement is 
determined by the personnel and equipment commonly used for the work. Thus, the relevant 
inquiry is how much land is necessary to properly conduct the canal work with the equipment 
commonly used to perform the work. 
Appellant correctly states that "the owner of a servient estate is entitled to use the estate 
in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not materially interfere with, the use of the 
easement by the owner of the dominant estate." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington 
Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518,522,20 P.3d 702, 706 (2001). Importantly, a servient estate is 
entitled to relief upon a showing that it is "obstructed from exercising privileges granted in the 
easement." Id. Aside from the above statement oflaw, Nampa & Meridian has limited 
applicability to this case. In Nampa & Meridian, the Court did not make any determinations 
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regarding the scope or width of the easement. Rather the focus was on whether there had been a 
showing that the proposed sidewalk and fence bordering the canal unreasonably interfered with 
the easement rights of Nampa Meridian Irrigation District. This Court's focus was on whether 
there was evidence of interference. The Court noted that there was insufficient evidence of 
unreasonable interference. This Court's holdings were based on the very specific information 
and testimony before the Court and not a general statement of how canal right-of-ways are 
determined. More specifically, this Court never articulated any analysis of how Idaho Code § 
42-1102 should be interpreted or applied to other disputes.! Moreover, Morgan concedes that 
the encroachments do interfere with New Sweden's ability to use the right-of-way. (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 10; R., p. 32B, 320-32R, 32T-32V, 32AA). 
In this case, Mr. Sheppard stated that at a minimum, sixteen (16) feet is required to 
conduct proper cleaning, maintenance, and repair. (R., p. 30B-30C: Sheppard Aff.,,-r,-r 9-10) 
Further, Mr. Sheppard has stated that the equipment commonly used for canal maintenance is a 
large mower which has a side-mower on the right side and a mower that trails. (R., p. 30B-30C: 
Sheppard Aff., ,-r 9; Exhibit A). In addition, New Sweden employs the use of a large excavator to 
clean and remove debris from the canals. (R., p. 30C: Sheppard Aff., ,-r 10). New Sweden has 
used the mowers to mow weeds, plants and small trees and maintain the canals for many years. 
1 Appellant erroneously suggests that this Court articulated a two-part test in Nampa & Meridian 
to establish the scope of an easement. Namely that the width is determined by (1) what is 
reasonable and necessary; and (2) only then should the personnel and/or equipment used to 
maintenance be considered. In reality, Nampa & Meridian does not support such a liberal 
reading of the case. 
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(R., p. 30B: Sheppard Aff., ~ 8: R., p. 30H: Ockem1an AfL ~4). It also important to note, that 
this equipment is of the general type conm10nly used by other irrigation districts in maintaining 
their canals. (R., p. 30C: Sheppard Aff., 10). Thus, the equipment used by New Sweden is of 
the type commonly used for this type of work. Because of the size and nature of the equipment 
used to maintain the canaL at least sixteen (16) feet is required to properly maintain the canal. 
Of note, the district courts analysis and conclusion on the size of the easement was 
consist \vith a ruling by Judge Joel Tingey of the Seventh Judicial District in a case entitled 
Reiley v. Salem Union Canal Company, Fremont County Case No. CV-2008-123. (See Affidavit 
of Blake G. Hall attached as Exhibit 1). In Reiley, Judge Tingey determined that the minimum 
width of the easement based on the testimony of the canal company, which stated that a 12 foot 
right of way was "barely sufficient" to conduct the maintenance on the canal. The plaintiff 
failed to "proffer any testimony as to the [sic] what would be the appropriate width of the right 
of way ... Based on the record, there is no rebuttal to the testimony of Jerry Dalling to the effect 
that a 12 foot right of way is absolutely necessary for the purposes of maintaining the canal." Id. 
at p. 6. 
In this case, the evidence that a minimum of sixteen feet is required to properly maintain 
the canal using the equipment commonly used for such work has never been rebutted. In fact, 
the only evidence ever presented to the lower court is that the equipment used by New Sweden 
has been employed for several years and that it is the same type of equipment commonly used by 
other irrigation district. (R., p. 30B-30C: Sheppard Aff., ,-r,-r 9-10). Given the evidence, in 
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conjunction \\'ith an acknowledgment of interference by Morgan, there \\'as no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the size or interference along the right-of-way. The district court 
cOlTectly held that 16 feet was necessary and reasonable for the maintenance, cleaning and repair 
of the canal. As was articulated in Appellant's brief, "[t]he scope ofthe easement is limited to 
what is reasonable and necessary at this point in time." (Appellant's Opening Brief p. 24 
(emphasis in original)). At this point in time, 16 feet is required to properly clean, maintain, and 
repair the canal adjacent to the Morgan property. The instant litigation arises out of New 
Sweden attempting to exercise its maintenance rights and the damage that allegedly resulted 
because New Sweden could not reasonably stay inside the 16-foot easement due to immovable 
encroachments. Thus, the district court's finding that the size of the easement was 16 feet is 
consistent 'with the unambiguous language of Section 42-1102. 
3. The Plants/Trees/Shrubs Located Exclusively Inside the Right-of-Way Were 
Properly Removed. 
Inasmuch as the easement is sixteen-feet wide, any plants, trees, bushes, shrubbery, or 
structures inside the right-of-way can be removed as part of the statutorily mandated cleaning 
and maintenance duties of the canal. It is undisputed that Morgan claims damages to wild rose 
bushs, a Russian Olive tree, sage brush and other shrubbery located on the canal bank (well 
within any right-of-way, ilTespective of size). Morgan also claims damage to a sprinkler system 
located within a few feet of the canal (again inside the right-of-way). (R., p. 14, 32F-32G: 
Morgan Aff, ~ 21; 32U-32V). 
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The unambiguous language of the statute provides that a canal owner is liable only for 
damage that resulted from a lack of maintenance, repair or accidental damage to the ditch itself. 
I.e. § 42-1102. It does not permit an award of damages to unauthorized structures or naturally 
growing vegetation within the easement. To permit recovery for damages to unauthorized 
structures, including trees, bushes, and shrubbery bordering the canal, within the easement 
would render the easement statute superfluous and without significance. Further, as to the 
plants, bushes and trees that were mowed2, that occurred as part of the routine maintenance to 
the canal, which is not only permissible under the statute but required in order to avoid potential 
liability for non-maintenance. 
Absent from Morgan's Appellant's Brief is any argument that removal of the trees and 
plants that are unquestionably inside the easement cannot be removed as part of reasonable and 
necessary maintenance and cleaning. Section 42-1102 permits a canal owner to clean, maintain, 
and repair the canal and the areas within the easement, which includes the removal of plants, 
bushes or trees within the easement. Properly maintaining the canal and easement is required as 
evidenced by the potential for damages for failing to maintain or repair the canal. See I.e. § 42-
1102; see also Sellers v. Powell, 120 Idaho 250, 815 P.2d 448 (1991) (confirming duty of canal 
owner to maintain and repair the canal). This Court has likewise stated that "the owner of such 
an easement over lands of another is required to 'keep up, maintain, and protect' his easement or 
20f note, the wild roses, Russian Olive Trees, bushes, and shrubbery on the canal are naturally 
growing vegetation and were not planted by Morgan and were mowed as part of the routine 
canal cleaning and maintenance. 
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right of way, and it is his duty to protect his ditch." Pioneer frr. Dist. v. Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 
738,285 P. 474, 475 (1930). New Sweden has an obligation to maintain the canal and the 
easement, which necessarily includes the removal of plants, bushes, and trees on that easement. 
In this case, mowing the areas within the easement was appropriate maintenance of the easement 
and consistent with the obligations imposed by Section 42-1102. 
4. The District Court Correctly Held That Encroachments Inside the Right-of-
way must Be Removed. 
It is undisputed that no 'written or verbal permission for the structures was ever given by 
New Sweden, nor was it ever requested by Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiffs structures are 
unlawfully encroaching on Defendant's right-of-way. Idaho Code Section 42-1102 specifically 
states that "No person or entity shall cause or permit any encroachments onto the right-of-way." 
Section 42-1209 contains identical language. There is no question that encroachments inside the 
right-of-way that interfere with a canal owners ability to clean, maintain, and repair the canal are 
prohibited. The rights of easement holders have long been established as this Court noted in 
Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, ---, 288 P.3d 810, 818 (2012), "an 
'easement owner has a right to remove obstructions unreasonably interfering with the use of the 
easement, so long as there is no breach of the peace." (citing Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 
891,728 P.2d 778,780 (Cl. App. 1986). 
Morgan's reading of Pioneer Irrigation is both misplaced and inapplicable to this matter. 
Morgan erroneously suggests that Pioneer Irrigation prohibits the removal of encroachments 
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that materially interfere with a ditch owners use of the right-of-way so long as the encroachment 
predated Idaho Code § 42-1209. Specifically, the issue before the Court was whether a ditch 
owner is entitled to self-help remedies prior to seeking judicial approval. In Prioneer Irrigation, 
the canal owner sought a declaratory ruling on whether it was entitled to the right of self-help for 
removal of an encroachment. The language relied upon by Morgan relates only to self-help 
remedies and not the overarching question here of whether encroachments that materially 
interfere with an easement right must be removed where judicial intervention has been sought. 
The only application Pioneer Irrigation has to the instant matter is that New Sweden may 
not be entitled to remove an encroachment without prior judicial approval. New Sweden has 
never attempted to remove any encroachments, such as the fencing, horse manger, or sheds (all 
encroachments that are readily movable because they do not have permanent foundations), 
without judicial approval. Considering this litigation arose because these encroachments sit 
inside the right-of-way and required New Sweden to temporarily leave the easement to 
maneuver around them is sufficient evidence of interference with New Sweden's right-of-way. 
New Sweden does not want to risk future damages each time it attempts to maintain the canal 
that borders the Morgan property as it maneuvers around the encroachments requiring the mower 
to leave the right-of-way. The existing encroachments materially and unreasonably interfere 
with New Sweden's statutorily granted right-of-way and must be removed consistent with the 
unambiguous language of Section 42-1102. In this case, New Sweden did not attempt to 
exercise its right to self-help but sought a judicial determination on the encroachments and 
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obtained an order for removal. As such, New Sweden has not breached the standards identified 
in Pioneer Irrigation. 
C. The Court Weighed All the Evidence and Found That New Sweden 'Vas Not 
Liable for Any Damage Outside the Easement. 
The only issue that was tried to the Court was whether Plaintiff could demonstrate that 
New Sweden was the proximate cause of damage to a stairwell and wellhead located outside the 
sixteen-foot easement. The only direct testimony presented on whether New Sweden's mower 
had struck either the stairwell or the wellhead came from Mr. Ockerman. Mr. Ockerman 
testified that he observed both the stairwell and wellhead when he entered the property and that 
he did not strike either object. Because Plaintiff had no witnesses to testifY to the contrary, 
Plaintiff attempted to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to satisfY his burden of production. 
Because the stairwell and wellhead were not within New Sweden's exclusive control, the 
doctrine was not applicable. The district court further weighed the evidence and properly 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that New Sweden was the 
proximate cause of any damage outside the easement. The record reveals that there was no 
evidence to support a conclusion that New Sweden damaged any structures outside the easement. 
Even with the lack of evidence, the district court concluded that Mr. Morgan was contributorily 
negligent by failing to keep the easement clear of encumbrances. The existence of a visible 
canal is evidence of a statutory right-of-way and along with that right-of-way is a requirement to 
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keep it clear. It is undisputed that Mr. Morgan did not keep the right-of-way clear-as 
evidenced by the instant litigation. 
1. The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor Is Not Applicable to this Matter. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a method of establishing negligence by means of 
"inferences, rather than direct proof." Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 355, 597 P.2d 595, 
598 (1979). When applicable, it "creates an inference of the breach of the duty imposed and 
replaces direct evidence with a permissive inference of negligence." Id. (citations omitted). 
Two elements must exist before res ipsa loquitur applies in a particular case: (1) "the agency or 
instrumentality causing the injury must be under the exclusive control and management of the 
defendant," and (2) "the circumstances must be such that common knowledge and experience 
would justify the inference that the accident would not have happened in the absence of 
negligence." Id. (citations omitted). Application of the doctrine is "limited to those cases which 
are within the common knowledge and experience of the average layperson." Kolln v. St. Luke's 
Reg'llv1ed. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 334, 940 P.2d 1142,1153 (1997). 
Accordingly, res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable when there are possibly multiple 
individuals who could have caused the alleged dangerous condition. In Christensen v. Potratz, 
the plaintiff sought to apply res ipsa loquitur when he was injured by a propane explosion in a 
camper. The court however rejected the plaintiff s argument. 
By affirming the conclusion of the trial court that res ipsa loquitur 
was not applicable in Kress, this Court did not hold that the 
appellant therein was barred from the use of the doctrine only 
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because of his O\\rTI possible negligence, but rather that where 
there are other possible explanations of the cause of an 
explosion, it is necessary that the plaintiff must present 
sufficient evidence pointing to the defendant's negligence as a 
cause of the injury, in order to apply res ipsa loquitur to that 
defendant. Where anyone of a number of persons, wholly 
independent of each other, may be responsible for an injury, the 
case is one for affirmative proof and not for presumption by way 
of res ipsa loquitur. 
100 Idaho at 355, 356 (emphasis added). Where other individuals may have been the cause of 
the claimed injury, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inappropriate. Jd.; see also Hansen v. 
Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 184 P .3d 206 (2008) (holding that where others have the ability to 
cause the damage, res ipsa loquitur does not apply). 
In this case, Morgan failed to present evidence that the damage could only have been 
caused by New Sweden. In reality, Morgan presented no evidence that New Sweden was the 
cause of the damage-a burden that must be satisfied by Morgan for the doctrine to apply. 
Rather, Morgan relied entirely on conjecture and an alleged temporal proximity to the mowing 
incident to establish the damage. The facts demonstrate that multiple parties, including Morgan 
himself, or the staircase's old age could have been the cause of the stairwell failure. The 
stairwell was over 25 years old, constructed of untreated wood, and appeared to have significant 
weathering as evidenced in the photographs presented at trial. (Tr., p. 381; 419). Additionally, 
there were no tire tracks from the New Sweden mower anywhere in the vicinity of the stairwell. 
(Tr., p. 427 :24-431: 19). It is not inconceivable that the stairwell was rotten and failed due to its 
age and well-weathered condition. (Jd.; see also Tr., pp. 419-420). It is equally possible that 
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other individuals, including Plaintiff could have struck the stairwell or caused the post to break. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that New Sweden caused the damage to the wellhead, which was 
also over 30 years old. (Tr., p. 397:20-402:20). Morgan had the same opportunity, or more, to 
strike the wellhead while mowing. It was undisputed that the location of the wellhead was in an 
area routinely mowed by Morgan. (Tr., p. 319:8-21). In sum, there are multiple parties, 
including the Morgan, which could have been responsible for the alleged damage. Accordingly, 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable. 
Relatedly, the circumstances surrounding the damage must be such that common 
knowledge and experience would justifY the inference that the accident would not have 
happened in the absence of negligence as it relates to the wellhead. Christensen, 100 Idaho at 
355, 597 P.2d at 598. In this case, Morgan failed to present any evidence that the damage to the 
wellhead was caused by the mower striking it. There was no evidence that the loss of pressure 
was the result of anything other than a pipe failure and/or the age of the well. The workings of a 
well and what is required to cause damage to a wellhead is outside common knowledge and 
experience. Morgan suggests in his Opening Brief' that he attempted to establish the break in 
the well through an expert "but he was not allowed to do that." (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 
33). The district court's denial of expert testimony was a direct result of his failure to timely 
name any expert. Morgan attempted, on the eve of trial to present expert testimony at trial, 
3 Of note, this issue is a new issue that was not identified in the Notice of Appeal and therefore, 
the record does not contain the underlying objections advanced by New Sweden or the district 
court's ruling on the denial. (See R., p. 83-86). 
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which \vas objected to by Ne\v Sweden. (Attached as Exhibit 2 and 3 are the Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support ofAiotion in Limine Re: Evidence of Damages. Witnesses, and Exhibits 
and the Court's l'viinute Entry addressing the A1otion in Limine). The district court denied the 
request because Morgan had failed to comply with disclosure requirements and specifically 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(I). (Vol. II, Tr., p. 65:19-75:5). Thus, any lack of 
expert testimony was a direct result of Morgan's own failure to adequately prepare his case for 
trial. In sum, Morgan cannot rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove his case. 
Nonetheless, even with expert testimony, the doctrine does not apply because New Sweden did 
not have exclusive control or management of the stairwell or wellhead. As such, the district 
court correctly denied Morgan's reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquilor. 
2. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Insufficient Evidence Existed 
on Causation. 
In Idaho, it is well-settled that in order for a plaintiff to recover under a negligence cause 
of action, he or she must establish that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 130 Idaho 705, 708, 946 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach ofthat duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage) (citations omitted). 
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In this case, Morgan alleged that New Sweden's actions were the proximate or actual 
cause of the damage to both the stairwell and wellhead. At trial, Morgan relied exclusively on 
circumstantial evidence, while New Sweden presented direct evidence on causation. While 
circumstantial evidence can be used in cases to establish a cause of action, the direct evidence 
presented by New Sweden demonstrated that Mr. Ockerman had no contact with either the 
stairwell or wellhead. (R., p. 30I: Ockerman AfL~,-r 10-12; Tr., p. 240:17-23; 249:23-250:13). 
Ultimately, the district court was persuaded by the direct evidence on causation. 
It was undisputed that the alleged damage to the stairwell and wellhead was outside the 
sixteen-foot easement. It is further undisputed that Mr. Ockerman did not strike either the 
wellhead or stairwell while mowing on June 25, 2009. (ld.). Mr. Ockerman's testimony at trial 
highlights his attentiveness to his surroundings as he mowed the right-of-way. Mr. Ockerman 
was questioned about his observations while mowing and stated that at one point he observed a 
faucet inside the easement: 
A. If you'll look further down past this tree where his law 
stops, and it's just pasture or grass, whatever, there was a faucet 
like is in your washroom you hook your washing machine to, there 
was a faucet about five feet within - from the level part of the 
canal. And it has some hose strung out. I stopped, turned off the 
equipment, got out of the tractor, wound the hose around the -not 
tight, just looped it around the faucet, and with my mower raised, I 
drove over it between the tires on the tractor. 
(Tr., p. 250: 16-25). He later clarified his actions: 
Q. And then counsel said - or excuse me, you said as you 
were mowing down there, you saw a faucet-
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A. Yes. 
Q. - sticking up? 
A. Right. 
Q. It was in the weeds, though, wasn't it? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. Had a hose attached to it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were being careful and observant enough of where you 
were going and what you were doing and how you were 
mowing to see that faucet sticking up in the weeds? 
A. It stuck up about maybe five inches. 
Q. Above the weeds? 
A. No, above the ground. 
Q. Above the ground? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far did the weeds stick up, because as I'm trying to 
understand tat, when I look at photograph 59 that counsel 
used to identify this faucet 
A. I would say they were a foot high anyway. 
Q. SO in spite of the faucet being in the weeds, you were 
observant enough to detect that faucet? 
A. Yes. I probably saw the hose first, but I stopped and like I 
say, I gathered it up. 
Q. The faucet was in your right-of-way. 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. But you didn't proceed over it and run it over; did you? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, you stopped, turned off the mower. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Got out of the mower. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Wrapped up the hose. 
A. Right. 
Q. SO that you wouldn't cut it. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you reengaged your mowers. 
A. Right. 
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(Tr., p. 269:2-270: 19). Mr. Ockerman was the only individual who testified at trial that was 
present during the incident. Mr. Ockerman emphatically stated that he never made contact with 
any structure outside the easement. (R., p. 301: Ockerman Aff., ~~ 10-12; Tr., p. 240: 17 -23; 
249:23-250: 13). He testified that he followed New Sweden procedures when temporarily 
leaving the easement because of an obstruction in the easement. (Id.; see also 259:7-260:25). 
Mr. Ockerman testified that had he struck anything, he would have been immediately aware that 
he had struck an object. (R., p. 301: Ockerman Aff.; Ir., p. 265:9-266:23). He did not 
experience any indications that he struck the stairs or wellhead. (Id.). Moreover, he 
acknowledged seeing the stairwell and testified that he did not mow in the area where the 
stairwell was located. He also acknowledged seeing the wellhead and noting that he carefully 
avoided hitting anything in Mr. Morgan's yard, including the wellhead and that the mowers were 
raised and turned off while he was not on the easement. (Ir., p. 271 :25-272:8). 
Conversely, Mr. Morgan never saw Mr. Ockerman strike either the wellhead or stairwell. 
(Ir., p. 397:20-402:20). Mr. Morgan relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence-namely that 
the stairwell and wellhead sustained damage. While he disputes the testimony of Mr. Ockerman, 
he cannot point to any testimony or evidence about how the stairwell and wellhead were 
damaged or that New Sweden was more likely than not the cause ofthe damage. Of note, Mr. 
Morgan failed to identify any alleged damage to the stairs or well at any time prior to the filing 
ofthe instant lawsuit. (Id.). Mr. Morgan claims that he discovered the damage within a day or 
two of the incident yet he failed to ever acknowledge the damage when he met with Kail 
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Sheppard and the Board of Directors of New Sweden during the July 23,2009 meeting following 
the incident. (Tr., p. 405:13-25; 411:18-414:17). Mr. Morgan should have been well aware of 
the damage but failed to disclose them during the subsequent meeting or in his Notice of Tort 
Claim filed with New Sweden. 
It is significant that when questioned about the alleged damage to the stairwell and 
wellhead, Mr. Morgan never testified that he saw any paint on the stairwell, wellhead, or mower. 
He likewise never identified any mower tracks near the alleged damaged property. Accordingly, 
Morgan failed to establish his burden of proof where the direct evidence shows there was no 
contact with the mower to the stairwell or wellhead. Because Morgan could not demonstrate 
that New Sweden was the proximate cause of the damage, his negligence claim failed. 
3. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Mr. Morgan Contributed to 
His Alleged Injuries. 
Mr. Morgan claims that the Court erred in finding that he was contributorily negligent. 
While the district court did address this issue in its Finds of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
discussion was irrelevant because there was no evidence to support a finding of causation by 
New Sweden. Rather, the district court's analysis of contributory negligence identified an 
additional reason why New Sweden would not liable for any damage outside the right-of-way 
("Assuming, arguendo, that New Sweden negligently damaged Morgan's stairway and wellhead . 
. . "). (R., p. 103). The focus ofthe district court was on the reason why Mr. Ockerman was 
forced to leave the easement as he performed cleaning and maintenance along the right-of-way. 
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Namely, that Morgan had maintained encroachments inside the right-of-way that required New 
Sweden to exist the right-of-way making Morgan "at least as negligent" as any potential 
negligence of New Sweden. 
Importantly, an analysis of contributory negligence is appropriate when other parties may 
have contributed to an injury, including the plaintiff. Idaho Code § 6-803 governs the extent of 
liability of a defendant. That section provides in pertinent part: 
ld. 
The common law doctrine of joint and several liability is hereby 
limited to causes of action listed in subsections (5), (6) and (7) of 
this section. In any action in which the trier of fact attributes the 
percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility to persons 
listed on a special verdict, the court shall enter a separate judgment 
against each party whose negligence or comparative responsibility 
exceeds the negligence or comparative responsibility attributed to 
the person recovering. The negligence or comparative 
responsibility of each such person is to be compared individually 
to the negligence or comparative responsibility ofthe person 
recovering. Judgment against each such party shall be entered in 
an amount equal to each party's proportionate share ofthe total 
damages awarded. 
Further, Idaho Code Section 6-802 provides: 
The court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the 
jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of 
damages and the percentage of negligence or comparative 
responsibility attributable to each party; and the court shall then 
reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of 
negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to the person 
recovering. Nothing contained herein shall create any new legal 
theory, cause of action, or legal defense. 
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Pursuant to this section, the Court must consider each individual or entity that may have 
contributed to a plaintiffs' injury. Le 'Gall v. Lewis County, 129 Idaho 182, 923 P.2d 427,430 
(1996); Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170,677 P.2d 483, 485 (1983); Pocatello 
Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P.2d 399 (1980). See also Hickman 
Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 758 P.2d 704, 706 (1988). 
Idaho's comparative negligence statute requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant's 
negligence was greater than that of the plaintiff before judgment can be rendered against that 
defendant. Idaho Code § 6-801; Ross v. Coleman Company, Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 830-31, 761 
P.2d 1169, 1182-83 (1988). Thus, a contributorily negligent plaintiff is not barred from 
recovering damages from a negligent defendant provided the plaintiff s negligence is "not as 
great as" the defendant's negligence. Also, the plaintiffs damages, ifnot barred, are reduced by 
the percentage of the total negligence attributable to the plaintiff. Idaho Code §§ 6-801 and 6-
802. Accordingly, ajury finding that 50% of the negligence was attributable to the plaintiff 
would preclude any recovery by the plaintiff. Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 188,579 P.2d 683, 
685 (1978). 
Here, the district court weighed the totality of the evidence before it and concluded that 
the very existence of the encroachments required a finding that "Morgan was at least as 
negligent as a result of permitting the encroachments to remain within the easement and causing 
New Sweden to exit the easement in order to circumvent those obstacles." (R. 103). Pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 42-1102, the fact that a canal is visible is sufficient evidence that a canal 
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company possess a right-of-way and that the right-of-way must be clear of encroachments, 
especially those that would interfere with a canal owners ability to clean, maintain, and repair the 
canal. The placement of the structures and encroachments within the sixteen-foot easement was 
a contributing factor to the alleged damage outside the right-of-way. New Sweden had no choice 
but to temporarily leave the easement to continue to satisfY its statutory duty to clean, maintain, 
and repair the canal. Had Mr. Morgan maintained the easement free of encroachments, New 
Sweden would not have been forced to exit the easement to continue mowing. It is undisputed 
that multiple encroachments prevented Mr. Ockerman from maintaining, cleaning or repairing 
the canal without leaving the easement to maneuver his mower around the immovable structures. 
Absent any encroachments, Mr. Ockerman would have had no reason to venture outside of the 
easement. It was Plaintiffs action of placing the encroachments within the sixteen-foot 
easement, some of which were a few feet off ofthe banks of the canal, which was the cause of 
Plaintiffs claimed damages. As the cause for Mr. Ockerman having to temporarily exit the 
easement, Plaintiff was responsible for at least 50% of the negligence thereby precluding any 
recovery from New Sweden. 
D. Attorneys' Fees on Appeal 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, New Sweden seeks an award of attorney fees in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 12-117. Section 12-117 provides for a municipal entity to recover 
attorney fees when "the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
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basis in fact or law." Under the statutes, the City is entitled to an award of attorney fees on 
appeal inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without foundation. 
Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to make a 
legitimate showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 
Idaho 371, 973 P.2d 142 (1999). In this case, there is no evidence that the district court 
misapplied the law. The language ofIdaho Code § 42-1lO2 is unambiguous and requires that a 
canal company clean, maintain, and repair the canals or risk liability for its failure. The district 
court correctly applied the language of the statute when it defined the size and scope of the 
easement. Finally, the district court heard the evidence and Morgan failed to present any 
evidence that New Sweden was the proximate cause of any damages outside the easement. 
Morgan relied on unsubstantiated conjecture in continuing to prosecute this matter. The district 
court's holdings were appropriate and Morgan has failed to present a legitimate reading of the 
statutes that would justifY the instant appeal. Likewise, Morgan is not entitled to any attorney's 
fees on appeal because he is neither the prevailing party and has failed to identifY how New 
Sweden's view of the clear language, as supported by the district court, could be deemed to be 
frivolous. This Court should deny Morgan's request for fees and grant New Sweden's request 
for attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the district court correctly applied Idaho Code § 42-1102 in 
determining the size and scope of the easement. The district court's ruling was correct regarding 
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the duties ofNe\:v Sweden regarding the encroachments and that they should be remoyed. 
Ultimately, the district court's rulings on summary judgment were supported by existing statute 
and case law and was proper. The Court should uphold the district court"s rulings on appeal. 
Furthermore, the district court correctly ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does 
not apply to this matter. The district court weighed the evidence and concluded that Morgan 
failed to establish that New Sv·/eden was the proximate cause of any damages outside the 
easement. Morgan failed to present any evidence to support this conclusion. Further supporting 
non-liability of New Svv-eden was the correct application by the district court that Morgan 
contributed to his alleged damages by placing structures inside the easement that required New 
Sweden to temporarily leave the right-of-\vay. Ultimately, the district court's findings of fact 
and conclusions oflaw \vere supported by the law and evidence and this Court should uphold 
those findings. 
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ON MOTION FOR SlJMMARY 
JUDGl\fENT AND ORDER 
Siu_EM UNION CANAL COMPANY, JERRY 
DALLING, individually, in his personal and 
representative capacity, KEM PALMER, 
individually, in his personal and representative 
capacity, GARON BROW"ER, individually, in 
his personal and representative capacity , 
Defendants. 
1. FACTUALBACKGROUN~ 
This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs brought an action against Defenda...'1ts alleging a trespass by Defendants onto the 
Plaintiff s real property. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the argument that 
actions taken by Defendants in maintaining their canal were within their statutory right of way 
and did not cOI'...stitute a trespass. By way of a counterclaim, Defendants also seek to establish 
their alleged statutory right of way and also seek relief as to alleged encroachments by 
Plaintiff(s) into the right of way. 
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II. STA.l'lDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
Summfu-Y judgment under LR.C.P. 56(c) is only appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. wilen assessing a motion for summary judgment, any disputed facts are construed 
in favor ofu1e nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Gem State Insurance Company v. 
Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10,75 PJd 172, 175 (2007); Lockheed A1artin Corp. v.Idaho 
State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793,134 P.3d 641,644 (2006). If reasonable winds 
might come to different conclusions, Slim.lllary judgment is inappropriate. Lane Ranch 
Partnership v. City a/Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584,166 P.3d 374, 378 (2007). 
The party moving for summary judgment always bears the burden of proving that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists on an element of the non-moving party's case. If 
the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing 
t.he absence of a genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift 
to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party is not required to respond with 
supporting evidence. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., at 600,944 P.2d at 1363. 
If the moving party has met its burden by either an affirmative showing of the 
moving pru-ty's evidence or by a review of the non-moving party's evidence, the burden 
shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue for trial does exist.Id.; 
Navarrette v. City a/Caldwell, 130 Idaho 849, 851, 949 P.2d 597, 599 (1997). To 
v,ithstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough 
to create a genuine issue. Nelson, A.IA. v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,410,797 P.2d 117, 118 
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(1990); Zimmerman v, Volkswagen a/America, LYlc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 
(1996). 
III. Al~ALYSIS 
A. Individual Liabilitv 
In the caption of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs name Defendlli'lt Dalling, 
Palmer, and Brower "individually, in [their] personal and representative capacity". There 
is no allegation in the complaint specifically addressed to these individuals. Defendants 
construe the foregoing as an attempt to impose individual liability by piercing the 
corporate veil of Salem Union Canal Company, and seek summary judgment on this 
issue. Plaintiffs have not challenged Defendants' construction of the claim against the 
individuals. 
The burden of proof applicable to a clahll to pierce the corporate veil is set out in 
case law. 
"To warrant casting aside the legal fiction of distinct corporate existence 
.,. it must ... be shown that there is such a unity of interest and ownership 
that the individuality of such corporation and such person has ceased; and 
it must further appear from the facts that the observance of the fiction of 
separate existence would, under the circumstances, sanction a fraud or 
promote injustice." Hayhurst v. Boyd, 50 Idaho 752, 761,300 P. 895,897 
(1931 ) (citations omitted). . ... Merely being a director or officer of a 
corporation is not sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. 
A1.aroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,114 P.3d 974, 983 (2005). 
Other factors to be considered are whether the individual was operating a 
Honeman show" (Chickv. Tomlinson, 96 Idaho 573, 531 P.2d 573 (1975)) and whether 
the enterprise was being operated v,i.thout regard for corporate procedures (Surety Life 
Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel ~Mortuary, In, 95 Idaho 599, 514 P.2d 594 (1973)). 
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The Court finds that the evidence does not support a claim of piercing the 
corporate veil. Accordingly, the claim against the individuals should be dismissed. 
B. Canal Company Right ofWav 
Defendants' seek summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' trespass claim. In their 
motion, Defendants also seek summary judgment as to the claims raised in their 
counterclaim. In the counterclaim, Defendants seek a declaratory judgment establishing 
the Canal Company's right of 'way and further declaring that Plainti...ffs have caused 
certain encroachments vyit.11n the right of way. These claims all relate to the Canal 
Company's right of way, if any, in relation to Plaintiffs' property. 
willie there has been some argument that the banks of the canal over time have 
eroded resulting in the canal creeping further onto Plaintiffs' property, that pa.rticular 
issue is not before the Court. Based on the claim of trespass, it is not for this Court to 
determine whether any such creeping occurred, or whether a party is entitled to recover if 
the banks of a canal move over time. Instead, the Court must consider the canal in its 
present condition, and the extent of any rights of way associated ,vith Lh.e canal. 
This issue is to a large degree controlled by legislative enactment. Pertinent 
statutes include the following: 
.... The right-of-way shall include, but is not limited to, the right to enter 
the land across which the right-of-way extends, for the purposes of 
cleaning, maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit, and to 
occupv such width of the land along the banks of the ditch. canal or 
conduit as is necessary to properly do the work of cleaning. maintaining 
and repairin2: the ditch.. canal or conduit with personnel and with such 
equipment as is commonly used. or is reasonably adapted, to that work. 
The right-of-way also includes the right to deposit on the banks of the 
ditch or canal the debris and other matter necessarily required to be taken 
from the ditch or canal to properly clean and maintain it, but no greater 
width of land along the banks of the canal or ditch thail is absolutely 
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Plaintiffs correctly argue that there is no statutory aUL'1ority specifically 
establishing a 16 foot right of\:\'ay. This point is ackt'1owledged by Defendants. In his 
affidavit, Jerry Dalling testified that a 12 foot right of way is "barely sufficient" to 
conduct maintenance on the canal b3.i-llcs. The foregoLl1g statutes provide that "t.'1e widTh of 
the right of way is to be no wider than "is absolutely necessary". 
In responding the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plai..ntiffs argue 
that a trespass occurred because Defendants had no right to cut trees, brush, etc. along the 
b3.i'lk of the canal. \\'bile Plaintiffs dispute the existence any right of way including a 16 
foot right of way, they do not proffer any testimony as to the what would be the 
appropriate \vidth of the right of way, if a right of way in fact exists (which is the 
conclusion of the Court). Based on the record, there is no rebuttal to the testLrnony of 
Jerry Dalling to the effect that a 12 foot right of way was absolutely necessary for 
purposes of maintaining the canal. Having found that a right of way does exist on both 
sides oft...h.e canal, the Court further concludes that there is no genuine dispute that the 
right of way needs to be 12 feet in width. Furthermore, the Court finds from the record, 
and as f'u..rther contemplated by the statutes, the removal of brush, trees, and other 
material from the right of way constitutes proper and permissible maintenance of the 
right of way. 
In Defenda...nts' counterclaim, Defendants further seek relief from encroachments 
within the right of way. The statues also address such encroachments: 
Rights-of-way provided by this section are essential for the operations of 
the ditches, canals and conduits. No person or entity shall cause or permit 
anv encroachments onto the rig:ht-of-wav. including: public or private 
roads. utilities. fences. gates. pipelines. structures. or other constnlction or 
Dlacement of obiects. without the written permission of the ovmer of the 
right-of-wav, in order to ensure that any such encroachments will not 
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unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the 
right-of-way. Encroachments of any kind placed in such right-of-way 
without express wTitten permission of the ov,'Iler of the right-of-way shall 
be removed at the expense of the person or entity causing or permitting 
such encroaCful1ent, upon the request of the ovmer of the right-of-way, in 
the event that any such encroachments unreasonably or materially 
interfere \vith the use and enjoyment of the right-of-\\·ay. 
Idabo Code § 42-11 02 (emphasis added). 
Easements or rights-of-way of irrigation districts, Carey act operating 
compa..'1ies, nonprofit irrigation entities, lateral ditch associations, and 
drainage districts are essential for the operations of such irrigation and 
drainage entities. Accordinglv. no person or entity shall cause or permit 
any encroachments onto the easements or rights-of-wav. including any 
public or private roads. utilities. fences. gates. pipelines. structures or 
other construction or placement of objects. without the v.Titten permission 
of the irrigation district. Carey act operating company. nonprofit irrigation 
entity. lateral ditch association. or drainage district owning the easement 
or right-of-way. in order to ensure that any such encroachments will not 
unreasonably or materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the 
easement or right-of-way. Encroachments of any kind placed in such 
easement or right-of-way, without such express wTitten permission shall 
be removed at the expense of the person or entity causing or permitting 
such encroachments, upon the request of the OW'Iler of the easement or 
right-of-way, in the event that any such encroachments unreasonably or 
materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the easement or right-
of-way. 
Idabo Code § 42-1209 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, any encroachment in to the right of way is in violation of the statute, 
if such encroachment is without the ",Titten permission of the Canal Company. The 
e"vidence establishes that Plaintiffs' encroachments in this case were without VvTitten 
permission, and therefore, in violation of the statutes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Canal Company has a right of way on boi:.c~ sides ofthe canal for the purpose 
of maintaining the canal and providing access for maintenfu"lCe. The evidence does not 
support a claim of trespass beyond the right of way. The evidence further establishes an 
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encroachment by Plaintiffs' into the right of way, which encroach..ment has been wiL'lout 
the VvTItten permission of the Canal Company as required by statute. 
Therefore, Defendants' motion for SUIll-ITIary judgment is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this. ~1 dav of Februarv. 2009. ->-- , " 
~OE~ E. TINGEY"-
DIS:rRrCT WDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERViCE 
fit'] 
I hereby certify that on this rA f day of February, 2009, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing documentl upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective court.house 
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Roy C. Moulton 
Moulton Law Office 
P.O. Box 631 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Jerry R. Rigby 
Gregory W. Moeller 
Rigby, Andrus, Moeller 
25 N ortb Second East 
Rexburg,ID 83440 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
"i f1/J;\ ~. 
By V(V~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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EXHIBIT "2" 
BLAKE G. HALL, ESQ. 
SAM L. ANGELL, ESQ. 
NATHAN R. STAR~ES, ESQ. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P .A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P. O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
Telephone (208) 522-3001 
Fax (208) 523-7254 
ISB Nos. 2434, 7012 and 7484 
Attorneys for New Sweden Irrigation District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO) IN ANTI FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 





NEW SWEDEN IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 
JOHN OR JANE DOE 1-10; and, JOHN DOE 
CORPORATIONS 1-10; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-6464 
li DEFEND~"t\JTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES, 





COMES NOW Counterc1aimantiDefendant, New Sweden Irrigation District, by and 
through counsel of record, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., and hereby submits this 
memorandum in support of its Motion in Limine re: Evidence of Damages as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
This action arose out of alleged negligent conduct by Defendant's employee that 
purportedly damaged property outside New Sweden's statutorily created easement. Vv'hen 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM ill SUPPORT OF MOTOIN IN LIMINE 
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Plaintiff commenced this action, he sought to have his rights regarding New Sweden's easement 
declared. On October 25, 2011, this Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order re: Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Motion to Amend, &: Motion to Strike ("Summary Judgment Order"). 
In the Summary Judgment Order, the Court carefully analyzed the scope of the easement, 
whether Defendant was responsible for damages inside the easement, and whether Plaintiff 
placed structures within the easement without New Sweden's permission. The Court concluded 
that New Sweden possessed a statutorily created easement on both sides of the canal. The size of 
the easement was set at 16 feet because this was the space required for New Sweden to properly 
perfonn care, maintenance, arid repairs on the canal. The Court further held that Plaintiff had 
improperly placed several outbuildings and structures inside the easement, which materially 
interfered with New Sweden's easement rights. 
Having previously addressed issues related to the easement, the size thereof, and that 
Plaintiff has inappropriately placed structures within the easement that interfere with New 
Sweden's ability to clean and maintain the easement, the jury's involvement is confined to a 
single question-whether New Sweden is responsible for alleged damage to structures outside 
the 16-foot easement. Any discussion by Plaintiff regarding the size ofthe easement, and ability 
to have the structure within the easement should be barred from trial. 
Additionally, Plaintiff has suggested that he is prepared to offer evidence regarding his 
damages. Plaintiff is not an expert, he has no experts that will be testifying at trial and therefore 
he is incompetent to testify regarding alleged damage. More specifically, Plaintiff cannot testify 
regarding the alleged cause of the damages, nor the cost to repair the alleged damage. Plaintiff s 
personal knowledge is limited to a check he purportedly wrote the Andrew Well Drilling. 
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Despite discovery requests, Plaintiff failed to provide any damage summaries. As such, 
testimony regarding damages should likewise be limited. 
ARGUMENT 
Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than without that 
evidence. Idaho R. Evid. 401. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Idaho R Evid. 
402. Additionally, evidence that may be relevant should nevertheless be excluded where its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or waste of time. Idaho R. 
Evid.403. 
There are generally two issues regarding the admission of evidence. The first is whether 
the evidence is relevant, and the second is whether a proper foundation has been laid for its 
admission. These are two separate issues. Relevance is an issue oflaw. State v. Page, 135 Idaho 
214, 16 P.3d 890 (2000). Whether or not a proper foundation has been laid for the admission of 
the evidence is a discretionary decision to be made by the trial court .. State v. Sheahan, 139 
Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003); Slackv. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 921, 104 P.3d 958, 963 (2094). 
A. Testimony Regarding Easement Size, Scope, and Structures Placed Inside 
Easement. 
It is anticipated that Plaintiff will attempt to argue that the size and scope of the statutory 
easement should be less than 16 feet. It is further anticipated that Plaintiff will attempt to argue 
that he is entitled to place structures within the easement so long as they do not materially 
interfere with the easement. Finally, it is anticipated that Plaintiffwil1 attempt to argue the 
DEFENDANrS MEMORANDl)M []\ SUPPORT OF MOTOIN IN LIM:INE 
RE: EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES, WI1NESSES, AND EXHIBITS - 3 
neighbors and/or other property owners along the New Sweden canals have structures within 16 
feet of the canal banks. All ofthis information is irrelevant and will only serve to confuse the 
issues for the jury, and thus, this type of testimony should be excluded from trial. 
This Court has previously ruled on scope of the easement. The October 25,2011 
Summary Judgment Order clearly analyzed the scope of the easement and whether the 
equipment used was reasonable and necessary. The Court stated that the equipment used was 
proper and of the type commonly used for canal maintenance. As such, any discussion of the 
easement size and scope and whether the equipment used by New Sweden is appropriate has 
previously been addressed by the Court. The Court reaffirmed its prior ruling when heard 
argument on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. 
1. Scope of easement. 
In Plaintiffs Disclosure of Trial Witnesses & Exhibits, dated March 27,2012, Plaintiff 
identifies various witnesses and exhibits that will address issues that have already been disposed 
of by Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, namely issues related to the easement and 
damages to property inside the easement. Plaintiff identifies Kent Ockerman, Kail Sheppard, 
and Louis Theil, all employees of New Sweden Irrigation, to address issues regarding the 
maintenance of the easement. It is anticipated that PlaintiffwilI call Kent Ockennan and 
question him about whether the mower was reasonable and necessary. It is anticipated that 
PlaintiffwilI elicit testimony from Kail Sheppard and Louis Thiel regarding the need for 
maintenance within the easement. Plaintiff should be precluded from questioning these 
witnesses regarding the equipment being used by New Sweden as well as whether maintenance 
andlor repairs along the easement were required as they are issues that have previously been 
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disposed of by the Court. Because these issues have already been disposed of, they are irrelevant 
to the jury trial and any reference or testimony thereof is inappropriate and should be excluded 
from trial. Plaintiff should not be permitted to re-litigate these issues. 
2. Photographic evidence. 
Similarly, it is anticipated that PlaintiffwilI attempt to use various photographs 
inappropriately. Plaintiff describes the purpose of various photographic evidence as follows: 
[tJhat entrance on the property on the date of the incident was 
neither reasonable nor necessary to clean, repair or maintain the 
canal; to confinu the path taken by the employee driving the 
tractor on the date of the incident; to illustrate the negligent use of 
the easement by the New Sweden employee; ... " 
(Plaintiff's Disclosure of Trial Witnesses & Exhibits, p. 2). He also seeks to introduce 
photographic evidence of other properties as rebuttal evidence to support his contention that the 
use of the ~asement was neither reasonable Dor necessary. (ld.). Plaintiff should be prohibited 
from using the photographs in the above-described manner. Issues of reasonable and necessary 
cleaning, repair, and maintenance have previously been addressed by the Court as discussed in 
the Summary Judgment Order. Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot use the evidence to suggest that the 
use of the easement was negligent Referencing other properties is also irrelevant to the instant 
proceedings. The photographs can, however, be used to identify structure on the property and 
provide a visual reference to the jury. Implying that New Sweden used the easement improperly 
should be prohibited by the Court. 
Rather, the only issue remaining for the jury is whether New Sweden negligently caused 
damage to Plaintiff's property outside the easement. Discussion of any damage within the 
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easement is merely inflammatory, prejudicial and irrelevant. The Court should carefully instruct 
Plaintiff as to the appropriate scope of the testimony and evidence. 
B. Plaintiff's Testimony on Damages Is Limited To The Single Check Produced During 
Discovery. 
It is anticipated that Plaintiff will attempt to present testimony regarding damages that 
exceeds the evidence disclosed during discovery. Specifical1y, Plaintiff suggests that he will 
offer testimony regarding alleged damage to Plaintiff's stairway and well. Plaintiff asserts that 
he will offer evidence regarding repair/replacement costs to both the stairway and well. Any 
evidence ofrepairsireplacement that have not been properly disclosed during discovery should 
be precluded from trial. 
1. Stairway 
First, any mention of damage to stairs should be precluded from trial. Plaintiff has no 
expert that can testify to cause of the alleged damage, what repairs are required; or how much 
said repa~s v.ril1 be. As this Court is aware, Plaintiff sough leave ,of the Court to disclose experts 
and evidence, including a bid to Tepairthe stairs, after the discovery cutoff. The Court denied 
Plaintiff's motion on March 8,2012. Plaintiffhas never produced any evidence regarding the 
alleged damage to the stairs. Rather, he has made unsupported and conc1usory statements on the 
cause of the damage and cost to make the repairs. Plaintiff is not an expert and lacks the 
requisite skill, training, and experience to opine on the cause of alleged stair failure. Plaintiff can 
only testify to what he has personal knowledge of. In this case, Plaintiff has no personal 
knowledge of how the stairs were damaged: 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTOIN IN LIMINE 
RE: EVIDENCE OF DA1v1AGES, WllNESSES, AND EXHIBITS - 6 
Q. . .. Can you tell me what you were attempting to depict with photograph No.1. 
A. Okay. One was the stairwell on the back of the bam. 
Q. Okay. Any why are you showing me that? 
A. I believe that he backed into this post right here and it knocked this stairway away 
from the bam. 
Q. Did you see him back into that post? 
. . 
A. I did not see him, but the next day when I went up there, I about fell off of them. 
Q. Are you aware of anyone who saw him back into the post? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see any paint on the post from the machine that he was driving? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see any evidence that this post had heen driven into? 
A. It was busted. 
Q. Did you observe any tracks of equipment running into this post? 
A. Didn't really pay any attention to it. 
(Bradley Morgan Depo., 87:21-90:5). This case is not a res ipsa loquitor case and Plaintiff must 
provide more than merely speculativ.e testimony regarding how the stairs were damaged. He has 
no proof that New Sweden caused the alleged damage and should not be permitted to testify 
regarding the same. 
Moreover, Plaintiff cannot randomly assign a figure to damages. He cannot attempt to 
introduce a bid for the stair repair because that would be hearsay. Plaintiffhas never produced 
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any evidence regardL.,g the cost to make the alleged repairs. It is wen established that damages 
must be taken outside the realm of speculation and must be proven with reasonable certainty. 
Eliopulos v. Condo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915, 643 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App. 1982). Plaintiff can 
only speculate as to the damages to the stairway. Because Plaintiff cannot produce anything 
more than speculative testimony, Plaintiff should be precluded from testifying regarding any 
damage to the stairway. 
2. \VeIl 
Second, Plaintiff cannot likewise testify as to the cause of the damages to the well. 
Neither can he testify about alleged future damages. As discussed above, Plaintiff requires an 
expert to opine on the damage to his well. Plaintiff has failed to appropriately identify any 
expert regarding well repair. Plaintiff should be prohibited from introducing testimony from a 
"Representative of Andrus Well Drilling" because they have not been properly identified as an 
expert. Plaintiff has continually failed to comply with disclosure requirements and specifically 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Defendant has not been provided with any 
op~nions and has, therefore, been precluded from obtaining any rebuttal testimony. It was not 
until the eve of trial that Plaintiff asserted additional damages that were allegedly related to the 
July 2009 incident. 
The only evidence regarding well repair that Plaintiff could potentially be pennitted at 
trial is the check Mr. Morgan wrote to Andrew Well Drilling in the amount of $752.72, 
apparently for the well repair costs. Plaintiffhas never produced any additional evidence of 
expenses incurred to repair the well. As addressed in Defendant's prior Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Pel1llit Disclosure of Additional Witnesses and Exhibits, Defendant has requested a 
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summary of all damages. The only documentation of damages ever produced in discovery is the 
single check for $752.72. Accordingly, the amount of damages potentially available are limited. 
Plaintiff cannot now attempt testify regarding undisclosed damages. To allow for this 
type of testimony would be in direct contradiction to this Court's Scheduling Order and the 
Idaho Rules ofCivii Procedure. Plaintiff's failures should not be rewarded at Defendant's 
expense. To allow Plaintiff to augment his damages above the check to Andrew Well Drilling 
would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. 
As such, the Court should limit the evidence regarding damages to the single check. 
Plaintiff has failed to appropriately identify any da.."'TIages to the stairway. Thus, testimony 
regarding the stairway should be barred. Further, Plaintiff cannot testify regarding future 
damages because he lacks the requisite expertise to opine on the well damage. The Court should 
limit the permissible evidence regarding damages because it is either irrelevant or lacks 
foundation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant it's Motion 
in Limine. Defendant requests that the Court limit the scope of testimony regarding the 
easement, damages. Defendant further requests that the Court restrict how Plaintiff will use 
certain exhibits as discussed above. 
3 tJv1\ Dated this __ day of dInaty, 2012. 
B . HALL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby ';l£rJ;,at I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ~ day of j, 2012, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
M. Brent Morgan 
M. Brent Morgan, CHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
1106 E. Center 
PocateJ1o, ID 83201-5202 
Fax: (208) 232-1900 
L:\JETI0186.389 Morgan\P\eadings\Limine (Memo).docx 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
tfJ Fax 
[ ] E-Mail 
[ J Overnight Mail 
[ ] Courthouse Box 
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EXHIBIT "3" 
IN THE DISTRICT COtJRT OF THE SEVENTH TIJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANl) FOR THE COlJNTY OF BONl\TEVILLF 
BRADLEY K. MORGAL~, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV-2010-6464 
) 
vs. ) MINUTE ENTRY 
) 
1\TEW S\VEDEN IRRIGATION ) 
DISTRICT; JOHN OR JAl\TE DOE 1-10; ) 
and, JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
AprilS, 2012, at 10:58 A.M., a defendant's motion(s) in limine and plaintiffs motion for 
relief from judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Dane H. Vi atkins, Jr., District 
Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. M. Brent Morgan appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Blake Hall appeared on 
behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Hall objected to plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment. 
Mr. Hall presented argument supporting defendant's motion(s) in limine. 
Mr. Morgan argued in opposition to defendant's motion. 
Mr. Hall presented additional argument supporting defendant's motion(s) in limine. 
Mr. Morgan responded. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
The Court addressed counsel regarding its ruling on the motion(s) in limine and outlined 
what issues remain to be presented at trial. The Court will exclude testimony from a 
representative from Andrews \Vell Drilling due to the late disclosure and/or limited disclosure. 
Mr. Morgan will be allowed to testify with that which is his own knowledge, the check he used 
to pay for repairs to the well, water and water pressure, what he paid originally paid for certain 
goods. The Court reserved a ruling for trial relating to testimony by the plaintiff regarding 
specific dollar figures for repairs. The Court will exclude photographs not previously disclosed. 
The Court denied plaintiffs Rule 60(b)3 motion. 
Mr. Hall waived a jury trial. 
Mr. Morgan will advise the Court as to whether the plaintiff would \vaive a jury trial. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: M. Brent Morgan 
Blake Hall 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
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District Judge 
